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1957 - 1970's 
A N Kakkar
The British Government was very clear about its role in Malaysia and 
Singapore In 1957, Duncan Sandys made it very clear that Singapore played an 
important role in maintaining their uninhibited freedom of movanent across the 
seas 1 During the emergency the British played a vital role m  weeding out the 
insurgents and their troops remained m  ¡jungles on active service conditions 
Soon after the emergency was over the rehabilitation programme started and the 
troops were provided with accomodation and training space which indicated the 
British perception of their role m  Malaysia-Singapore area m  the years to 
come In 1959, a full Commonwealth Brigade was stationed near Malacca m  a new 
cantonment The cantonment was constructed to house between 7,000 to 9,000 men 
and its cost turned out to be worth more than 9 million 2 jn 1959, it was also 
reported that Britain would spend around 3 million to develop the R A F  
(Royal Air Force) base on the Singapore island 3 Similar development projects 
were undertaken by the British Government Though there were signs of 
opposition to the maintenance of British Bases in Malaysia and Singapore, the 
Britishers were sure that their base at Singapore was the safest The 
independence of Malaya had already posed many problems and when Tunku Abdul 
Rahman proposed the Malaysian Federation Plan, there was same sign of relief m  
Britain The very formation of Malaysia provided more security to the British 
defence investments The aims of the British policy in this region were mainly 
to
(a) get rid of its responsibilities of colonial rule,
(b) protect the region frati Communist domination keeping in 





of the fact that Malaysia had constitutionally the freedom to have
its own defence setup independent of any outside assistance, it was felt and
Malaysians that in case of an external aggression, military help 
would be indispensible After independence a defence agreement was
concluded with the United Kingdom which came to be popularly known as
Defence Agreement 4 This agreement provided security against
external threat and provisions for maintaining British troops and bases with
mutual approval
population as
The Malaysian Government had always taken sections of the Chinese
a security threat because they played a significant role as part
Government of
of MCP (Malayan Communist Party) during the emergency Apart from this there 
was generally a subdued feeling among the Asian countries to oppose the 
alignment with the Western powers In the case of Malaysian agreement with 
Britain for maintaining their security, the forceful opposition came from 
Indonesia Tne sizable Chinese population was also an important factor and the 
Malaya decided not to join South East Asian Treaty Organization in 
order to avoid unnecessary tension with the Chinese population of Malaysia and 
the Peking Government 5 it was indeed a very desirable and calculated move on 
the part of Tonku Abdul Rahman to have an agreement with the Government of 
United Kingdom Initially the treaty was not aimed against Indonesia because it 
was perhaps never perceived that Indonesia would oppose the formation of 
later date with an intensity that was noticed in the earlyMalaysia at a 
sixties
Perhaps m  view of the cordial relations between the two governments no
time limit was specified m  the treaty although it had provided for the review
3as and when necessary Even after the emergency, the British troops continued 
to be stationed in and outside the federation
Tunku was well aware of the fact that the Government of Malaysia if left 
alone, to look after its defence would have to spend quite a large sum and this 
would drain out its economic resources required for reconstruction of the new 
society
But the creation of Malaysia in 1963 left Tunku with no alternative but to 
revise the agreement which had no clause to provide the inclusion of Singapore, 
Sabah and Sarawak6 and use of British troops directly for SEATO purposes without 
the permission or agreement of the Government of Malaya 7
As long as Singapore remained within the Federation no controversial issue 
cropped up between the Government of Malaysia and the United Kingdom but soon 
after the separation of Smgagpore from the Federation m  August 1965 some 
problems cropped up The Government of Singapore insisted that restrictions 
must be put on the use of the troops though the Britishers could continue to 
maintain the base While all these developments were taking place there was no 
evidence of any such perception of the British role which could demand greater 
commitment by Britain for the purposes of maintaining Malaysia's security 
Here it would be useful to note the attitudes of the Malaysian and 
Singapore governments on the question of security, m  order to understand 
certain aspects of their defence policies Both the countries gave the 
impression that the British presence contributed to the stability and security 
of the region of Southeast Asia
Immediately after separation of Singapore from the Federation, the 
Singapore Government expressed its desire for control over the British Bases to 
prevent their use for aggressive purposes 8 Malaysia also expressed its
viewpoint ac 
same time re
knowledging the importance of retaining the British Bases and at the 
iterating that the bases would not be used for SEATO purposes 9 
Malaysian and Singaporean attitudes were also similar in many respects 
regarding the US role in the region Lee Kuan Yew was not willing to consider 
lty of US presence m  Singapore10 though his statements on Vietnam 
¡1967 clearly indicated that Singapore Government attached great
the possibil 
during late
importance to the US presence in Southeast Asia for countering the extension of
Chinese infl 
presence wit
uence in the region 11 Malaysia took a similar view of the American 
h very cautious and careful diplomatic utterenees 12 Tun Razak said
Malaysia 
Vietnam and
on 16 Septemaer, 1965, that there was no question of bringing US forces into
Malaysia also took a similar view to that of Singapore regarding 
Tunku said on 5 July, 1967, that an Anencan defeat in Vietnam would 
result in Chinese domination of Southeast Asia 14
As regards the threat evaluation of the two countries there were 
The m a m  threats to Malaysian internal security were thedifferences
clandestine Communist Organization in Sarawak and the possibility of the revival
of the guerr 
conflict was
ilia warfare by the MCP An intensification of the communal 
considered to be a potential threat to the political stability but 
the Malaysian officials were sure that such a conflict if erupted will not take 
a military form
There appeared to be two groups within the Malaysian Government which 
perceived Malaysian interests regarding Indonesia differently One group was 
Tun Razak, and the then Secretary of the Malaysian Ministry fordominated by
Tunku The 
was dependen
External Affairs, Tan Sh n  Ghazali Shafie and the other group was doninateed by
former ves of the view that the Malaysia's future role m  the region 
t on her ability to foster a close relationship with a non-Communist
5Indonesia The latter was of the view that politico-strategic ambitions of 
Indonesia might lead to deterioration m  Malaysian-Indonesian relationships 16 
It was believed by the governments of Malaysia and Singapore that the 
increasing Chinese influence m  Southeast Asia was a major threat to the 
security of their countries 17 Singapore's existence as a largely Chinese State 
in a predominantly Malay region did provide her an opportunity to view its 
security problems m  a different perspective 18 Singapore's view was bound to 
be different regarding threat from Indonesia and actually Singapore saw danger 
in a racial reapproachment between Malaysia and Indonesia 19 Lee Kuan Yew also 
maintained that their long term survival demanded that there was no government 
in Malaysia that goes with Indonesia otherwise it would be rather difficult for 
Singapore to survive being sandwiched between Malaysia and Indonesia 20 
In view of these perceptions and problems it was felt that the 
Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement must be renegotiated
According to the act of the Malaysian Parliament which provided for 
Singapore's separation it was clearly stated that
The Government of Singapore will after Singapore day afford to 
the Government of United Kingdom the right to continue to 
maintain the bases and other facilities occupied by their 
service authorities within Singapore and will permit the 
Government of UK to make such use of these bases and 
facilities as that government may consider necessary for the 
purpose of assisting m  the defence of Singapore and Malaysia 
and for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace 
in Southeast Asia 21
This clause provided for a continued British presence in Singapore m  the 
immediate futiré In the long term however the question of the renegotiation of 
the defence agreement to take account of the new situation was to loom large 
The most crucial problem was the future shape of the agreement and there 
seemed to be only two alternatives A tripartite treaty could be negotiated 
between Britain, Singapore and Malaysia or else separate bilateral treaties 
could be negotiated between Britain on the one hand and Malaysia and Singapore 
respectively on the other
It was also desirable to have defence relations between Singapore and 
Malaysia and Singapore and U K on a permanent legal basis 22 Here it will be
useful to have a fresh look of the three governments concerned i e UK, Malaysia
and Singapore The British Government welcomed the idea of a new defence 
agreement witi Singapore but could not reconcile to negotiate a tripartite 
agreement Britain made it clear that the treaty with Malaysia remained
Singapore being an independent and sovereign State would have tooperative but
negotiate a fresh treaty with Britain for her defence 23 On 31 August, 1965, a
statement iss 
presence in S 
was to be rev
□ed by the Commonwealth relations office affirmed that the British 
ingapore was covered by the separation agreeement, nevertheless it 
ísed because the agreement was between Britain and former Malaysia 
which included Singapore 24 m  October, 1965, contradictory statements were 
made by Healey and Brown on the question of negotiating a new treaty with 
Singapore Denis Healey told the House of Commons that there must be
negotiations 
defence relat
with the Singapore Government in due course to re-establish air 
ions to a formal basis 25 Brown was of the view that the British 
provided for in the Separation Agreement and hence there waspresence was
7nothing new to look at 26 The defence White Paper of 1966 stated that Britain 
would retain its military facilities in Malaysia and Singapore for as long as 
these governments had no objections to the agreed conditions 27 However, no 
mention was made of the question of renegotiating Britain's defence position in 
the area On 15 July, Healey stated that the question of a new defence treaty 
between Britain and Singapore would be deferred until the Indonesian position on 
confrontation was clarified 28
The Malaysian Government was consistantly in favour of tripartite defence 
treaty On 18 August, 1965, Tun Razak stated that Singapore had agreed to seek 
a new tripartite treaty, and not bilateral treaties as at first seemed 
likely 29
The Singapore Government was less responsible to the idea On 1 September, 
1965, Tunku Abdul Rahman accused Singapore oi being trady m  discussing defence 
matters of mutual interest 30 The main emphasis of Singapore Government was on 
bilateral relations and negotiations with the United Kingdom On 19 August, 
1965, Rajarantnam stated that Singapore wanted the British Bases to remain and 
that the terms of their use would be renegotiated with the British defence 
authorities tee Kuan Yew, however, made it clear that the bases would not be 
used for acts of aggression against any neighbour m  Southeast Asia and that 
Singapore would retain ultimate control 31 on 2 September Dr Goh Keng Swee 
also stated that the government of Singapore was ready to have negotiations with 
Britain on a new defence agreement 32 This offer was not followed by any 
immediate action however On 23 February Dr Goh Keng Swee stated m  the 
Singapore Parliament that the position of the British Forces m  Singapore was 
still governed by Article 13 of the act of the Malaysian Parliament providing
8e's separation 33 He also reaffirmed that the existing agreementfor Smgapor





, April, talks took place between Wilson and Lee Kuan Yew on the 
the proposed defence treaty between Britain and Singapore It was 
the treaty would be married with Britain's military arrangements in 
trouble cropped up over the question of accomodating returning
Singapore forces, which had served under Malaysian Command m  Sabah, in their
original bar 
by Royal Mai 
Article V of
racks at Camp Temasek vduch had during their absence been occupied 
aysian Regiment troops Tunku Abdul Rahman contended that under 
the separation agreement, the Malaysian Armed forces were given the 
right to remain in Singapore for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore, and that 
it was the responsibility of the Singapore government to seek alternative 
accomodations for the Malaysian forces before they could be asked to move out of 
the Camp Temasek





e was a strained relationship between Malaysia and Singapore The 
which existed between the Federation and seceding Singapore 
exist m  different forms 36 This situation was further worsened by 
elief that Britain was favouring Singapore in the disputes between 
the two countries In May, 1966, Tan Slew Sin (the then Malaysian Finance 
Minister) was unable to obtain a loan of $ M 630 million from Britain While 
Britain explained the refusal of the request m  terms of her balance of payments 
difficulties, Malaysia took the view that Britain was withholding aid in an 
attempt to speed the conclusion of a defence treaty between Malaysia and 
Singapore 3/ The ending of confrontation, by making defence matters of less 
immediate concern might have made the conclusion of new defence arrangements
9appear less urgent Also, with the uncertainty of British role in time to come, 
it might have been felt that a deferment of discussions on possible new 
arrangements was advisable until the position was clarified Finally, one might 
suggest that the ad hoc arrangements on defence which had covered the situation 
m  post separation period were reasonably satisfactory in their operation 
despite the differences between the parties involved New defence arrangements 
could clarify the legal position of the parties involved but not settle the 
political differences and disputes
In view of the British withdrawal the Anglo-Malaysian defence agreement was 
to be seen m  a different light The concerned parties indicated from time to 
time their respective viewpoints The British Government wanted to have a new 
understanding which could fit m  the changed conditions Healey, at a press 
conference m  Kualalumpur on 11 June,1968, stated that revision of the treaty 
would have to be delayed until a new defence pattern for the area had 
emerged 38 Tunku also felt that sane understanding was required in order to 
place Singapore's participation on the formal basis But at the time of the 
June, 1968, conference, Tun Razak stated that there was no urcnediate intention 
of ammendmg the agreement 39 On the other hand, Singapore acted very cooly and 
Goh Keng Swee said that Singapore was not undully concerned that it had no 
separate defence treaty with UK 40 The Communique of the Five Power Conference 
stated that a new understanding about the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement 
would be necessary m  due course 41
In many respects an effective defence of Malaysia and Singapore required an 
integrated approach on the part of the two governments concerned Singapore 
could not develop a policy of 'defence m  depth' without Malaysian cooperation 
As far as Malaysia is concerned it would be placed m  a vulnerable position if
the defences of Singapore were weak or directed against Malaysia Apart from 
failing to bring about a new arrangement for defence, Malaysia and Singapore
failed to ari:ive immediately at a commonly acceptable Model for defence
cooperation After the separation Malaysia and Singapore continued to discuss
the probiens of defence cooperation at the meetings of joint defence council42
and combined operations committee to try to coordinate the activities for
defence of tíe two countries
By the end of 1966, Singapore decided to withdraw from these two bodies on
the grounds :hat her interests were not adequately represented 43
One issue which vras symptomatic of the difficulties experienced m  
achieving credibility in cooperation was the dispute over the occupation of 
barracks m  Singapore in Febryary/March 1966 This dispute took a very serious 
turn when the 2nd Battalion of Singapore Infantry Regiment returned home from 
Sabah and wished to occupy barracks at Camp Tamasek which were being used by 
Malaysian troops Malaysia took the view that her troops were entitled to
occupy the b arracks under the terms Article V (3) of the Separation
Agreement 44 Singapore rejected the Malaysian interpretation
A statatient issued by the Singapore Government pointed out that Article V
(3) declared that 'the Government of Singapore will afford to the Government of
Malaysia the right to continue to maintain the bases and other facilities used
by its military forces within Singapore 45
Since Camp Teraasek was not used by its military forces at the date of the
separation ajreement, the continued occupation of the barracks had no legal
basis 46
A settlement of the dispute was reached on 11 March, 1966, when it was
agreed that a temporary camp would be built at Bukit Sembawang in Singapore to
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house the Malaysian troops who had been asked to leave Camp Temasek, the 
Singapore Government would provide the site, while the Malaysian Government 
would foot the bill of building the camp 47
On 23 February, 1966, Dr Goh Keng Swee commented on the implications of 
the failure to achieve effective defence cooperation
It is important that we should never lose grasp of the proper
perspective of the fundamentals of our defence policy Both 
Malaysia and Singapore do not have adequate defence forces at 
their command to deter aggression from their larger 
neighbours, nor are they able successfully to fend off any 
ma]or assault that may be mounted upon us So for sometime, 
until our defence forces are substantially increased, we shall 
have to depend on the military shield provided by our 
Commonwealth allies But our Commonwealth allies will be 
willing to provide us with this shield only if they find their 
International political situation a tenable one and the 
domestic scene stable enough for their effort to be effective 
If the governments of Malaysia and Singapore are unable to 
cooperate effectively m  their common defence effort, this 
must in turn adversely affect the efficacy of the defence 
arrangements with Britain, Australia and New Zealand who are 
expending-large sums of money and men m  retaining their 
military commitments in this region So, cooperate we must, 
but this cooperation must be as between two sovereign states 
and not as between big brother and his satellite 48 with this
12
view in mind, various consultations took place to prepare the 
way for new defence arrangements On 5 March 1966, Goh Keng 
Swee and Tun Razak met to work out a mutual defence pact 49 
It was subsequently reported that some understanding had been 
reachsd between the two countries but no formal agreement 
could take place 50 a number of meetings were reported to 
have been held in the beginning of 1968 51 Tunku had 
suggested to share the military installations for joint 
defence after the ultimate British withdrawal and to this 
Singapore's defence Minister Lim Kim San responded favourably 
in order to strengthen the security of the region 52 in the 
communique of the five Power Conference of June 1968 Malaysia 
and Singapore declared that the defence of the two countries 
was indivisable and required close and continuing cooperation 
between them 53 On 12 June 1968 Goh Keng Swee and Tun Razak 
both emphasized the importance of defence cooperation their 
two states 4 The comminque also noted the intention of 
Malaysia and Singapore to establish a joint Air Defence System 
and to cooperate in naval defence 55
Now looking at the impact of the British withdrawal it 
will be necessary to note the changes m  the Malaysian and 
Singaporean defence thinking A few details on the importance 
of the British military presence to Singapore are significant 
to note The presence of the British services directly 
contributed 60 million sterling per annum to Singapore's 
economy which was about 20-25 perent of gross domestic
13
product Between 30,000 to 35,000 local people were directly 
employed on the military base, with at least the same number 
of people being dependent on the base for their livelihood in 
a less direct sense 56
In the period immediately after separation a continued 
British commitment to the defence of the region was assumed by 
both Malaysia and Singapore At the same time one can perhaps 
detect in the anti-American tone of some statements by Lee 
Kuan Yew a certain fear that Britain might reduce its 
commitments 57 The deterioration m  relations between 
Malaysia and Britain during 1966 might have indicated a 
lessened desire on the part of the government of Malaysia to 
maintain a British presence 58 such an attitude could also be 
symptomatic of the reduction of tensions m  the period which 
saw the formal ending of confrontation Arrangements for the 
withdrawal of British forces from East Malaysia were made at 
talks in Kuala Lumpur and Denis Healey was also present on 
this occasion (7 July 1966) 59
During 1967, the fact that Britain contemplated not 
merely a reduction of forces, but a phased military withdrawal 
became evident The visit of Commonwealth Secretary, Sir 
Herbert Bovden to Singapore and Malaysia in March 1967 was 
mildly reassuring to the governments concerned Bowden gave 
an assurance that the Commonwealth Strategic Research would 
not be touched and that even after subsequent reductions, 
Britain would still retain a considerable force m  the Far
East 60 Healey's visit to the two countries in the following 
month (April 1967) was the first indication that Britain 
contemplated actual withdrawal in long term On this occasion 
Malaysia emphasized Britain's obligation to continue to fulfil 
her commitments under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence 
Agreement 61 on 29 April, 1967, Tun Razak stated that he was 
confident that a withdrawal on Britain's part would not reduce 
the security of the region, Malaysia had enough forces62 to 
look after internal security and there was no need to expand 
local forces 63 Tunku Abdul Rahman on 24 May, 1967, stated 
that a British withdrawal would not affect the defence of the 
region so long as Britain could send help when it was 
required 64
Before the publication of 18 July, 1967, White Paper on 
Defence, Lee Kuan Yew and Tunku Abdul Rahman visited London 
for futher consultations Firstly, Lee's visit was motivated 
by a hope to be able to retain same form of British presence 
which could contribute toward the maintenance of peace and 
security in South and Southeast Asia He felt that Britain 
must ensure that a state of relative stability and security 
would continue to prevail 65
Secondly, it was Lee's intention to gain sufficient time 
to enable Singapore to adjust adequately to the new 
situation 66 Hence his major problem was to prevent and 
ensure against a precipitate withdrawal of the British
15
military support 67 The Tunku during his talks in London from 
5 to 10 July, also stressed two main points
(a) Britain's obligation under the defence agreement 68
(b) Maintenance of British troops at pre-confrontation 
level 69
In view of the above, the reactions to the July White Paper, from Malaysia 
and Singapore were obviously expected Lee Kuan Yew emphasized the need of self 
reliance on the part of Singapore m  order to cooperate with her allies He 
said, "We must build, together with such friends and allies as have an interest 
in the security and future of the Singapore-Malaysia region, sufficient forces 
for our own security "70 He also stressed subsequently vhile speaking at the 
Parliament that adjustment to the new situation by making new arrangements was 
very necessary m  order to have a successful regional security plan 71
Statements by Tunku and Tun Razak emphasized that Britain would continue to 
honour her obligations under the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement 72 The Tunku 
felt strongly that there was no reason to worry m  view of the British assurance 
to help Malaysia as and when necessary with their Air and Naval support 73 The 
Five Power Conference which had been proposed on the eve of Tunku's departure 
for London (4 July) was seen as providing the means for evolving a satisfactory 
defence arrangement for the region after the withdrawal 74
In January, 1968, Thomson's visit to Kuala Lumpur and Singapore and the 
abasence of Healey, the Defence Minister pointed the way of a crisp private 
pronouncement of another swing in British policy rather than 'negotiations' 75 
Thomson's visit ves to accelerate the withdrawal of British forces from the 
area The Malaysian approach was again to emphasize Britain's obligation under
16
Lee Kua
the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Arrangement 76
i Yew on the other hand expressed a more overt concern and suggested
the possibility of retaliatory action against Britain if satisfactory
arrangements were not made to enable Singapore to meet the new situation 77
Actually, for Singapore, telescoping the whole withdrawal, deepened the 
challenge to the economy and gave an impression that Lee's virutal Anglophilia 
had been a time wasting dead end 78
It was also reported that though the British troops were withdrawing from 
Malaysia they will continue to offer military aid to help them meet their 
security problems Similarly, to keep Singapore satisfied it was decided to 
help them with liberal economic assistance 79 But Singapore as said earlier was 
unhappy about the situation and the Observer1s correspondent noted that there 
were strong pressures on Singapore to pullout of the sterling area, reclaim its 
reserves of cbout 200 million, and cancel all economic preferences granted to 
Britain in Cc.se the Labour Government withdrew British forces before 1975 80
While answering Professor Michael Howard of the Department of War Studies,
London in an interview Denis Healey told that by 1968 the 
changed completely In 1964, there were large scale operations in 
the East - and Britain had 50,000 troops involved in confrontation and at that 
time none could think about the future 81 since the relations between Malaysia 
over the years since the end of confrontation improved 
there was no possibility of a war Actually the two governments 
had started cooperating m  dealing with the Communist terrorists on the border 
between Sarawak and Kalimantan Malaysia saw no threat from the north The 
critical issue governing the British withdrawal was that the local people must 






Though the withdrawal meant economic setback for Singapore, it was the 
principal saving action for Britain which could contribute to the overall 
defence cut between 400 million to 500 million pounds 82
Lee's later trip to London was made in an attempt to soften the impact of 
the British withdrawal on Singapore 83 Malaysia had refused to send missions to 
support Lee Kuan Yew at London The Tunku stated that Malaysia understood the 
British position 84
Lee's trip did moderate the Britishers and the date for the completion of 
the British withdrawal was deferred from March to December 1971 85
Britain also agreed to train Singaporean pilots and radar operators for the 
air defence system which could cover Malaysia and Singapore 86 in addition Lee 
Kuan Yew hoped to obtain a formal agreement to enable Singapore to use British 
Guided Missiles and other anti-aircraft weapons 87
In retrospect looking at Malaysian and Singaporean attitudes on British 
decisions of 1968 one finds two things very clearly
(l) There was an attempt to clarify the future British role 
m  the area
(n) More attention was given to achieving self-reliance m  
defence
Malaysia seemed to place a greater emphasis on Britain's continuing 
responsibility for defence of the Malaysia-Singapore area than did Singapore 
Though Malaysia wanted British presence it is interesting to note here that an 
ally like Malaysia for whom Britain was fighting decided suddenly to change, not 
merely its policies, but also the pattern of its existence, and deliberately 




course of events This was done by Malaysia in 1965 (August) and the Prime
admitted it 88 on 31 January, 1968, the Tunku stated that he
expected British help if Malaysia was harassed or attacked by a country more or
own strength 89 Singapore on the other hand thought more in terms
of self-reliance In an important speech to the Singapore Parliament on 9 May, 
1968, Lee Kuan Yew declared that Singapore could and would build-up an adequate 
defence force by 1972 90 Malaysia and Singapore also undertook talks with the 
British Government on matters related to the British withdrawal On 10 May, 
1968, Tun Razak conferred with British Ministers m  London to clarify, the 
nature and usefulness of the defence equipment which would be left behind by the 
United Kingdom 91 At the end of May, 1968, Lee Kuan Yew also went to London for 
talks with the British Government on economic and defence questions As a 
result of this visit Singapore was offered about a dozen jet trainer aircrafts 
for its airforce and training facilities with RAF for two groups of Singapore 
fighter pilots Britain offered 50 million aid to Singapore and 25 million 
pounds to Malaysia Both aid programmes were to cover a five year period 92
At the Five Power Conference of June 1968 the objectives of clarifying 
Britain's future role and of achieving greater reliance in defence continued to 
be important 93
On the question of Britain's future role, the Tunku declared that, 'We 
sincerely hope that her general capability would not be more general than 
capable '94 He also advanced a point which had not been raised before 
"Britain especially cannot escape that continuing responsibilities arising out 
of Sabah and Sarawak since no one could have imagined that without the formation
of Malaysia Britain would have been able to relinquish her entire responsibility
towards these two states by 1971 95
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The conference communique clarified certain details of the planned 
development of Malaysia's and Singapore's defence forces m  the direction of 
greater self-reliance in view of the indivisibility of their defence 96 jn 
particular Singapore continued her plans to develop an airforce to contribute to 
the joint air defence system 97 Malaysia indicated that she would be prepared 
to consider additional contribution over and above the existing strength of her 
armed forces which were already a substantial contribution to joint defence 98 
Australia had also promised air support to the integrated air defence system up 
to 1971 In June, 1968, it was evident that Australia had not yet determined 
whether or not it would preserve a defence commitment in Southeast Asia after 
1971 let alone assume a major share of the security responsibility upon the 
departure of the British 99 The Conference also agreed to hold joint ground 
exercises in the Singapore-Malaysia area after 1971 It was also agreed to 
establish a joint exercise planning staff and a jungle warfare training school 
on a multinational basis 100
Britain stated that a major exercise should be held in 1970 which would be 
the forerunner of joint exercises to be held regularly after 1971 These 
exercises would enable Britain to test and improve its ability to deploy troops 
rapidly from the United Kingdom to Singapore if necessary after 1971 101 
Response to the conference by Singapore and Malaysia was guarded with concern 
being voiced that Australia and New Zealand would only "take into account" the 
conference discussions in arriving at their long term defence policies 102
After considerable intra-governmental debate and consultation the 
Australian Prime Minister Gorton told in February, 1969, that Australia would 
maintain forces of all arms m  that area after British withdrawal without 
setting any specific terminal date 103 The Prime Minister of New Zealand also
20
of Australia
stated that n s  country would maintain its forces in Malaysia and Singapore even 
after 1971 and its supply and administrative functions will be merged with that 
and therefore New Zealand's policy was tied up with Australia 104 
Gorton made it very clear that the Australian presence would be maintained 
only if it is desired by Malaysia and Singapore as necessary and the forces 
would be made available to fight against externally inspired subversion and
f provided it was deemed desirable by the Australian Government He 
very plain that if acting as a deterrent in any given situation was
infiltration 
also made it
beyond the capacity of Australian forces, the support from outside allies would
be necessary 
of its own i
But any decision to commit the Australian troops would be m  view 
mterests, and circumstances at any given time 105 This statement 
was indeed important because it clearly indicated the future trend of Australian 
commitment
May 13ti riots of 1969 also threatened the establishment of the Five Power 
defence group This riot had immediate reaction in Singapore but nothing 
significant lappened there because of strict administrative measures Australia 
perceived that the stationing of troops in Singapore-Malaysia area meant 
involvement even m  a possible communal n o t  and a possibility such as this had 
been stipulated against m  the Gorton policy statement of February 1969 106 
In June, 1969, a high level five power meeting took place in Canberra but 
nothing concrete could emerge due to Malaysian-Philippine tensions over 
Philippines' claim to Sabah and the May 13th riots Australia wanted to remain 
neutral m  any such situation m  which the South East Asian Nations were 
involved Gorton argued that Australians were committed to help in maintaining 
and defending Malaya but not Malaysia West Malaysia is the 




reference to Malaya implied reluctance to become involved m  any dispute between 
the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah He was also concerned about possibly 
becoming involved in any future security operations on the Sarawak-Indonesian 
border which might pit Australians against Indonesian soldiers 107 He also 
questioned the indivisibility of the defence of Malaysia and Singapore The 
reactions were very sharp and Lee Kuan Yew commented that "while Britain 
remained m  the Far East, Australia had always been in the role of deputy 
sheriff But now that Australia had accepted the Sheriff's badge, she was 
showing that she did not know how to draw a six-gun "108
As far as the military aspects of the proposed five power arrangement were 
concerned, the developments took gradually a new shape as a result of different 
advisory working groups set up during 1968 conference These groups were 
discussing from time to time the issues concerned with logistics, force levels 
and a large scale joint exercise The scheduled exercise was meant to test the 
British capability to airlift troops from Britain at short notice These 
working groups also discussed about the jungle warfare school at Ulu Tiram in 
Southern Malaysia 109 The question of billets for Australia and New Zealand 
troops was also discussed and both the countries were reported to have insisted 
on shifting their units from Terendak near Malacca m  Malaysia, to Singapore 
But the Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew felt that Australian forces 
would be better employed in West Malaysia as a token of Australian commitment to 
maintain "forces of sanity and stability" This statement was linked with the 13 
May, 1969, incident in which Chinese m  Malaysia suffered considerable losses 
He thought that the decision regarding the movement of the Australian and New 
Zealand troops to Singapore was taken particularly in view of the possibility of 






Rahman to sue 
Power defence
0 The ANZUK States continued to encourage continuing
Singaporean-Malaysian defence cooperation but the mutual distrust prevented any
tandmg regarding such a cooperation
an decision to move its troops to Singapore and public statements 
view about defending the whole of Malaysia irritated Tunku Abdul 
:h an extent that he publicly stated the uselessness of the Five 
arrangement H I  He felt that the only alternative to this 
arrangement vas to have peaceful borders and good relations with neighbours, 
i e , Indonesia, Thailand and to a limited extent Singapore Such co-operations 
had already s tarted at bilateral levels in order to co-ordinate the joint 
anti-insurgent operations
After Britain relinquished her predominance as a senior partner, Australia 
assumed the responsibilities and provided a senior officer for the unified Air 
Command However, during this interim period, Australian approach did not give 
Malaysia and Singapore a feeling of security 112
The political developments m  Australia also made one a little pessimistic 
regarding the future of a five power arrangement The Labour Party clearly 
stated that elfter assuming power all the Australian troops from Vietnam, 
Singapore anc Malaysia would be withdrawn 113 Though in April, 1970, the five 
power-nations carried out a joint military exercisell4 m  the north of Malaysia 
named Bersatu Padu (Malay for complete unity) it was believed m  some quarters 
that this arrangement did not have much importance for Malaysia but Tun Razak in
an interview
defence prob:
said that the five power arrangement was good for providing
psychological support to Malaysia and Singapore m  view of their inseparable
ems 115
The Military reality was completely overshadowed in this exercise because
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in reality there was no conventional threat Threats to the security of 
Malaysia and Singapore came mainly from active insurgency conducted by MCP 
During the exercise, the Communist terrorists of the Malayan Ccmmunist Party 
ambushed a patrol of Malaysian Rangers and killed seven members of the unit In 
such a situation the exercise clearly indicated that ANZUK forces would never be 
committed for fighting insurgents and therefore ANZUK forces had no utility 
against the guerrillas operating from sanctuaries in southern Thailand and 
Malay-Chmese riots
Though the British efficiencyll6 during this exercise indicated their 
interest m  rotating units to this area, it had no significance for the security 
of Malaysia and Singapore but for psychological boost which they got in any case 
due to the five power arrangement It created an illusion of security
After this exercise Malaysia Singapore forces never cooperated in the same 
way and actually this was the first and the last exercise m  which Singapore 
troops operated in Malaysian territory
Though it was maintained by the Malaysian government that the jungle 
training centre m  Johore Bahru was meant for training 5 power nation's troops 
in Jungle warfare, Tun Tazak felt that the Australians, New Zealanders and 
Britishers needed the facilities much more than Singaporeans 117 on the other 
hand in Singapore the author was given to understand that the Malaysians did not 
want to train Singaporeans because they feared Chinese domination in an 
insurgent operation against Malaysia 118 Perhaps Malaysians thought that in a 
Chmese-Malay conflict in Malaysia which could have spillover effect in 
Singapore, it was quite likely that the Chinese of Singapore trained in jungle 
warfare are used against Malaysia 119





thought that Australia and New Zealand would be able to take over
frati Britishers in due course of tune and shall help Australians and New 
Zealanders in taking greater responsibilities They also thought that Malaysia 
would be able to buy time to resolve its internal communal problems and the
British troops would not be costlier than Labour government's plan 
for equal participation and continued to hand over bases and other
facilities to Singapore 120 The Britishers also gave an assurance to 
participate m  Five Power Arrangements after 1971 and ANZUK States accepted the 
idea of consultations on future security threats to Malaysia and Singapore On 
21 April, 1971, all the Five Power Nations decided to have an agreement 
stressing that in the event of any armed attack, the member countries would hold 
an immediate meeting for consultations to decide about joint and independent 
measures for dealing with the threat 121 The implication was that the actual 
deployment cf foreign military assistance under the terms of the arrangement 
will be determined by the cmcumstances of a specific situation that can be 
shown to be seriously detrimental to the plan and security of the 
Malaysia-Singapore region Apart from the nature and extent of the threat, and 
the issues it gives rise to, any foreign military assistance will depend on the 
ability of the governments of Malaysia and Singapore to contain the potential or 
actual threat 122
It was quite clear now that Singapore and Malaysia would have to take care 
of their own security in view of their indivisibility for the defence purposes 
The cooperation m  this field started getting evolved slowly because it was also 
realized that the foreign countries were no longer willing to take 
responsibilities of the defence of Malaysia and Singapore for many more years to 
follow 123 The differences continued to exist on housing arrangements for ANZUK
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forces and the operation of Jungle warfare school in Johore (Malaysia) which was 
to be run by British until November, 1971 124
The dispute regarding the housing problem was finally resolved with 
Australian and New Zealand units moving into rent free quarters m  camps they 
had not chosen and Singapore being extended an invitation to train her artillery 
arri tank units m  Australia Like Israel, Singapore relied on quality to 
compensate for numbers - quality of men, morale, training and equipment 
Initially, the Singapore government had Israeli officers as advisers at the 
Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute (SAFTI) 125
On 1st November, 1971, letters were exchanged between Malaya and Britain to 
bring about an end to the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) For Britain 
the replacement of AMDA by the 5-power arrangements was of considerable 
importance for it could help in establishing a closer identity with her vital 
interests m  Europe It would be unrealistic if one did not take into account 
the assumption that in the 1970s and beyond Britain will see her ultimate 
defence and security tied up more closely with circumstances m  Europe where her 
military contribution is considerable 126 Australia and New Zealand also wrote 
letters to Malaysia to terminate their association with the AMDA Instead of a 
treaty, letters were exchanged between the ANZUK states and Malaysia and 
Singapore setting out the arrangements which would apply in post 1st November 
period ANZUK forces were around 6000 strong with Australia bearing the maximum 
manpower load 127 The ANZUK comprised of
a) 3 Infantry Battalions
b) 5 to 6 destroyers or frigates
c) 2 submarines and supporting fighter bombers, helicopters,
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long range reconnaisance and transport aircraft





ifcnphibious personnel carriers, 
Tanks and artillery
This effort was quite an important indicator to show the interst on the part of 
ANZUK forces to cooperate But one thing was clear that this force was quite 
inadequate to defend Malaysia and Singapore from an external attack 128 The 
5-power forces had their own limitations The ground units were limited in 
their effectiveness because of the scarcity of training areas and their 
circumscribed mission They represented the unpractical aspect of the 
arrangement In view of their capability, in a given situation of external 
attack, the ground forces would require strong reinforcement or withdrawal
The integrated air defence system could not work very efficiently because 
of high technicality involved in it Malaysia and Singapore both were trying to 
acquire expertise in the field of air and missile systems The ANZUK units kept 
rotating from time to time The most important and significant area of 
cooperation was naval activities which were very pragmatic The ships patrolled 
the Straits of Malacca and the adjacent waters This helped in controlling the 
piracy and smuggling to a great extent
On the whole the ANZUK forces operated quite independently and the
limited to a
Malaysian and Singaporean forces had hardly anything to do The cooperation was
few instructors who functioned within the Malaysian and Singaporean
military Britain had even gone to the extent of making it very clear that she
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would not participate m  any joint control except in the case of the Jungle 
Warfare School at Ulu Tiram near Kota Tinggi m  Johore The only significant 
joint training operation which can be cited is Bersatu Padu exercises and this 
indicates that proper attention was not paid to have more educative joint 
training exercises and perhaps this was motivated by the desire to maintain the 
dominant role of the senior partners, i e , Australia, New Zealand and United 
Kingdom Actually these partners could have taken greater initiative to help 
developing a stage of self-sufficiency for Malaysia and Singapore Since they 
did not do so even today Malaysia and Singapore depend upon the outside powers 
m  a hypothetical situation of external attack The lack of senior partners' 
help in solving the defence dilemma of Malaysia and Singapore can also be 
attributed to lack of co-operation and mutual distrust between Malaysia and 
Singapore The partners had clashes of national interest and this retarded the 
advance for genuine cooperation
The five-powar arrangements helped in providing a sense of security to the 
foreign investors and in reducing the chances of confrontation between Malaysia 
and Singapore Actually ANZUK was an extension of American maritime interests 
in Southeast Asia and these forces limited the activity of Soviet Naval arms in 
the Straits of Malacca area
The five-power arrangement had a very uncertain future because of the 1972 
elections in Australia and New Zealand where the labour parties had promised to 
withdraw its troops if it came m  power
Malaysia was quite aware of the limitations of the 5-power arrangements and 
the idea of neutralization was strongly floated by the Malaysian government 
stating that they would withdraw from 5-power arrangement Neutralization was 
an alternative model for Security that the Malaysian leadership had m  mind 129
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Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew also felt that as long as the U S 
stayed in Asia the "Five Power Arrangement can go "130
Australia announced in 1973 that her ground combat troops would be 
withdrawn by :he end of the year and the rest of the troops by 1975 New 
Zealand decided to maintain its troops as part of the 5-power arrangement m  
Singapore instead of withdrawing with Australia
All the member states held the view that the pact was useful in some way 
but the magnitude of the credibility of the 5-Power pact seemed to be on the 
lower side In spite of the fact that for Malaysia and Singapore, reliance for 
sane time on external powers was quite useful, a strong desire for self-reliance 
seemed to be prominent in the minds of the leaders
This arrangement is essentially to be seal as a stopgap one because of 
being a transitional provision for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore 
Nobody could completely rely on it unless it was converted into a formal treaty 
This arrangement was also necessary from the point of view of Britain, Australia 
and New Zealand For Britain, the five Power arrangement permitted a 
substantial reduction in her military commitments for the protection of Malaysia
and Singapore 
Suez together
The decision to introduce changes in Britain's position East of 
with the cancellation in the middle of 1970 of all 50 F-lll 
aircraft ordered fran the United States and a general reduction in force levels 
amply indicated that Britain could not afford to maintain military bases outside 
Europe and the Mediterranean apart from independent territories and certain 
other exceptions As maintained earlier Britain's defence cuts were an economic 
necessity and it was unlikely that her defence policy would undergo any dramatic 
changes in the coming years Replacement of AMDA by five power Defence 
Arrangement was expedited fast m  view of the fact that Britain would more
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easily guard her interests m  Europe On the other hand, it was a sop to the 
conscience that same machinery be devised to replace its traditional military, 
presence then being wound \jp In spite of early replacement of AMDA by five 
power arrangement nothing substantial followed and one reason why it never 
really got off the ground, was differences m  individual objectives of the 
member states and as a matter of fact the differencesl31 were far deeper than 
the agreement In such a situation, it was no wonder that minor differences 
seemed exaggerated whether it was a Singapore government statement on the need 
for tanks or the use of "Malaya" instead of "Malaysia" by a visiting Australian 
leader, events which emphasized the political imeompatab111ty of the partners 
For same time the arrangement seemed to be three power argument with Australia, 
Malaysia and Singapore frequently at loggerheads During this period Australia 
often seemed to be m  the wrong By delaying for more than a year its decision 
to leave forces in the area after 1971, it created uncertainties in Singapore 
and Malaysia Australian reluctance was also accompanied by disturbing reports 
that Prime Minister Gorton favoured some sort of Israeli-type home defence, 
presumably operating within the country's natural frontiers
In such a situation vtfien uncertainty prevailed regarding the role of 
partners of the 5 power arrangement, rethinking started m  all the capitals and 
particularly in Malaysia and Singapore
Before trying to understand the dynamics of post five power arrangement 
period it is necessary to understand the attitudes of Australia and New Zealand 
toward Malaysian Security Australian attitudes towards Malaysia cannot be 
accepted as part of their general attitudes to Southeast Asia A concern for 
Malaysia-Singapore was reflected m  the past and it is interesting that a token 
military presence has been maintained till recently
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Party came to 
out of Maiaysi 
were hardly ar 
pull out immed
Soon after the victory of the Labour Party in the New Zealand national 
election (November 1972) the Australian elections also took place and the Labour 
power The new governments m  both the countries decided to pull 
a-Singapore region in view of the British withdrawal and there 
y differences between the two governments Australia was ready to 
lately whereas New Zealand wanted it to be a gradual process New
Zealand proposed to leave her forces in the area for sometime m  order to 
contribute to the stability of the area and as a result an independent New 
Zealand command was created at the end of January 1974
New Zealands's action was part of their broad approach to the Pacific and 
Asia region But all this was part of a transitional behaviour The approach
of the Austral îan leaders illustrated the extent to vrtuch the five power
arrangement meant different things to different parties at different times
What was important was not so much the arrangement itself as the presence of
Australian forces m  Malaysia and Singapore within its framework of defence 
strategy The main reason for Australian presence was to help prevent the 
spread of Communism The idea was also to let the old order pass away m  a 
gradual and undisruptive way Australia had to work m  the past towing western 
line of approach for the region by blending together the British and American 
approaches It is of significance here to note that Sir Robert Menzies once 
argued that "if báttle against Communism is to be an effective one, it must be 
won as far north of Australia as possible "132 it was well understood by 
Malaysia and Tun Razak had stated during his April 1967 visit to Australia that 
Australian assistance to Malaysia would in turn benefit Australia because 
Malaysian area could be the Australian front line in the event of aggression 
from north He was also confident of Australian and New Zealand support because
31
these two countries had always regarded a threat to Malaysia as a threat to 
themselves 133
It was therefore assumed throughout the whole of the Menzies Era and during 
successive administrations of the Liberal Party, that Australia's line of 
defence began in Southeast Asia But the Australians later started looking at 
the region in a different perspective A policy was adopted to bring about 
closer co-operation with the countries of the region through bilateral 
relations Their defence assistance scheme for Indonesia is a case in point 
Since this assistance scheme came into being there grew a feeling that Five 
Power Arrangement was actually of no use But they decided to continue with the 
arrangement as long as Malaysia and Singapore wanted them for building up their 
air defence and allied capabilities For Australia to carmit its ground troops 
after the Vietnam experience was rather difficult To them, providing 
equipment, training and technical support was the only way to maintain their 
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s interview with the Secretary of the Ministry of Defence (July 
Morning Herald, 19 June 1969
Straits Times, 2 August 1969
Ibid
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About 25,000 troops participated The exercise ("HANESIA") was to repel 
invasion of Malaysia by conventional forces It is interesting to note 
here tijiat the exercise was considered to be a political necessity to 
provide a psychological boost against an external threat
Dick Wilson's interview with Tun Razak reproduced m  New Nation 
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120 Straits Times, 22 July and 2 August 1970
121 Mirror (Singapore), voi 7, no 18, 3 May 1971
122 One may relate to this the decision of the Singapore Government, after 
British withdrawal from East of Suez, to building her own defence 
resources in the form of compulsory national conscription for full-time 
military training This defence strategy helped in raising a reserve 
force of approximately 50,000 trained soldiers
123 Integrated Air Defence System, Naval cooperation and the establishment of 
Naval defence Council composing one senior officer from each member 
country were encouraging signals Besides this, a joint consultative 
council was established to provide a framework for political-military 
discussions i e crisis situation
124 New Nation, 24 June 1971
125 New Nation, 23 June and 23 December 1971
126 It is interesting to find that at the close of 1974 the British defence 
minister argued that Britain could not in 1975 and beyond, continue to 
meet all her commitments to NATO on its various fronts in view of it state 
of economy
127 Australia m  1971 had 3000 men, Britain had 2000, and New Zealand 900 only 
(See J D B Miller, "The Mutual and Shared Commitments of Australia and 
New Zealand)', in Australia Outlook, voi 22, no 1, April 1968
128 See Military Balance, 1972-73 (London, The International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 1972)
129 It means "Firmly United" It was a combined defence exercise designed to 
simulate conditions as they could be after Britain's withdrawal It had 
assumed an mvastion of west Malaysia in 1975 by an imaginary state, 
"Ganasia" from the northeast This, and various other assumptions seemed 
to be designed to fit the contingency to British capabililty rather than 
to test Britain's capacity to meet the contingency
130 Straits Times, 3 October 1972
131 Ibid , 8 December 1972
132 Australia, with New Zealand m  tow, came into the picture belatedly with 
less than compelling sincerity it was motivated by internal factors 
rather than by the regional security interests
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Singapore and Malaysia had their own profound differences, including the 
lingering suspicion that they were potential adversaries Malaysia was 
inclined tovrards nonalignment But Singapore, obsessed with the need to 
win international business confidence found in a well publicised defence 
pact with Britain and Australia a short cut to political stability and 
security The five power arrangement was actually a five way clash of 
interests Fron the point of view of the government's local political 
stance] what is important is not so much the arrangement itself as the 
presence of Australian forces in framework This is put across m  an 
affirmation of the Australian government's determination to prevent the 
spread I of communism, to be contrasted with the opposition Labour party's 
lack of credibility m  this regard The old order of forward defence had 
to go in view of British withdrawal and running down of American 
commitments The five Power arrangement provided a framework within which 
the old order could pass away in a gradual and undisrupted manner
133 Philip 
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Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez (0 ü P , London, 1973) ,
